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Abstract 
This review addresses three recent developments in the collective action literature. First, we 
demonstrate that normative and non-normative collective action participation can be predicted 
by different psychological variables. Second, we show that collective action participation has 
emotional and identity-related consequences for activists that shape their motivation to engage 
in future action. Third, we illustrate that members of disadvantaged groups are faced with two 
dilemmas: the dilemma of alternative ways of identity management and the dilemma of 
affective loyalties towards the outgroup, both of which present barriers to social change by 
undermining protest intentions. In the final part of the review, we outline an integrative 
framework that maps out the dynamic processes between antecedents of, barriers to and 
outcomes of collective action participation and highlight a number of directions for future 
research. 
 
Keywords: Collective action, protest, social change, non-normative collective action, 
disadvantaged groups, disidentification, identity management, contact, terrorism 
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We have witnessed an upsurge of protest around the world in the last 5 years: popular 
uprisings across the Middle East fought oppressive regimes, movements across Europe 
protested against spending cuts, and, more recently, citizens of Hong Kong went onto the 
streets to demand democratic change. When and why do people engage in protest? And, 
equally importantly, why do they so often remain passive in the face of injustice, inequality, 
and oppression? These questions have fascinated social scientists for decades. While there has 
been extensive research on collective action and social movements in the field of sociology 
(e.g, Della Porta, 1995; Klandermans, 1997), social psychology has only relatively recently 
started to add to this literature by unravelling the psychological factors that motivate 
engagement in protest. This work has already provided important insights into the 
psychological processes that play a role in protest behaviour by demonstrating the crucial 
relevance of subjective grievances, justice-related emotions such as anger, a sense of agency 
and efficacy, and identification with the disadvantaged group as motivators of participation 
(see van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008, for a review). The present review builds on this 
body of work, but aims to extend it in three important ways.  
First, we note that collective action research in social psychology has focused almost 
exclusively on relatively moderate forms of action, such as participation in peaceful 
demonstrations. Protest can, however, include a much wider array of strategies, including 
more disruptive actions such as sabotage or violence (see Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 
1990). Our first proposition in this review is that different sets of appraisals and emotional 
responses underlie support for, and engagement in, more radical forms of collective action. 
Specifically, we aim to demonstrate that radical action is most likely to be supported when the 
perceived efficacy of one’s group in effecting the desired social change is low, and among 
individuals who respond to injustices with contempt towards the authorities, rather than anger. 
Second, we observe that the focus on developing predictive models has resulted in a 
lack of attention to dynamic processes in collective action (but see Drury & Reicher, 2009; 
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van Zomeren, Leach & Spears, 2012, for exceptions). We aim to demonstrate here that 
activists’ experiences during collective action feed back into their motivations to continue 
their engagement by fueling emotions, shifting efficacy expectations, and shaping identities. 
Specifically, we examine the effects of participation per se, the role of responses to success or 
failure of collective action, and the effects of (a lack of) support of the action by the group on 
whose behalf the movement acts.  
Third, we address the broader question of why protest is surprisingly rare despite 
ongoing high levels of social injustice around the world. In order to shed light on why people 
fail to develop an interest in collective action for social change, we discuss two dilemmas 
members of disadvantaged groups are faced with. Specifically, we suggest that the motivation 
to engage in collective action is reduced when a) members of disadvantaged groups are 
provided with alternative strategies of identity management and b) affective loyalties (to the 
advantaged group) present a psychological barrier to engaging in confrontational action.  
Below we first present a brief overview of social psychological theorizing and 
research on collective action, with particular focus on the role of grievances and related 
emotions, efficacy calculations, and identities. We then present empirical evidence from our 
own research program that substantiates our three main propositions. We conclude by 
integrating these findings and outlining directions for future research drawing on the three 
themes that have guided our recent work. 
WHY DO PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN COLLECTIVE ACTION? 
Collective action can be defined as any action that promotes the interests of one’s 
group or is conducted in political solidarity (e.g., Becker, 2012a; Wright et al., 1990). Thus, 
collective action is a form of political protest (in this review we use the terms collective action 
and protest synonymously) and can take diverse forms. Most well-known forms of protest are 
demonstrations, blockades or strikes. Collective action can, however, also be engaged in by 
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single individuals (e.g., by signing a petition or voting on an issue), or take on more radical 
forms such as property damage or physical violence.  
The question of why people engage in collective action has been studied from a 
number of theoretical perspectives. A range of different variables that contribute to the 
emergence of protest behaviour have been identified, but it is beyond the scope of this review 
to discuss each of these factors (for a more comprehensive review, see van Stekelenburg, 
Klandermans, & Van Dijk, 2011). Rather we focus here on the three most influential 
theoretical approaches that have also provided the basis for our own work, specifically 
approaches emphasizing collective grievances, the perceived efficacy of collective action, and 
identification with the aggrieved group. Importantly, although political solidarity is also a 
form of collective action, in this review we focus on collective action initiated by members of 
disadvantaged groups only. 
The first approach, encompassing so-called grievance theories such as relative 
deprivation theory (Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002), emphasizes the importance of a 
subjective sense of disadvantage, unjust treatment, or the violation of important moral 
standards as the catalyst of collective action. Work on relative deprivation theory further 
stresses that feelings of deprivation, such as anger, resentment, and outrage are particularly 
important in motivating protest (see Walker & Smith, 2002). This more recent focus on 
emotion is in line with work on group-based emotions (e.g., Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 
2001; Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993), which proposes that, in situations where 
individuals categorize themselves as members of a social group, group-related events become 
self-relevant and arouse specific intergroup emotions together with their associated action 
tendencies. Thus, the appraisal that the ingroup has been treated unfairly arouses group-based 
anger and evokes action tendencies to confront the offender (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000).  
While grievances are a necessary condition for collective action to occur, they do not 
automatically translate into action. Supplementing this line of work are approaches that focus 
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more on the pragmatic and instrumental aspects of collective action. This research has 
highlighted the importance of the perceived efficacy of collective action (e.g., Gamson, 1992; 
Klandermans, 1997; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This idea is related to the notion of stability in 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which posits that collective action is most 
likely to occur when the group hierarchy is viewed as unstable and there is therefore scope for 
change. Much research on collective action has emphasized more proximal, psychological 
factors such as agency (Gamson, 1992) or collective efficacy (Bandura, 2000), which 
correspond to the extent to which the ingroup is perceived as being capable of bringing about 
the desired change. Consistent with this general approach, there is extensive evidence that 
willingness to engage in collective action is a function of a subjective sense of collective 
efficacy (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & 
Leach, 2004).  
A third influential approach stresses the importance of identification with the 
aggrieved group in mobilizing action and sustaining solidarity and group commitment (Drury 
& Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Of particular importance for 
collective action are politicized identities, which emerge with the awareness of shared 
grievances and the attribution of blame to an external agent, such as another group, the 
government, or “the system” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). A politicized identity is 
accompanied by an internalization of the goals and norms of the social movement, connects 
people with the plight of the disadvantaged group, and creates an inner obligation to act on its 
behalf (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Research which has 
compared the predictive power of identification with the broader disadvantaged group (e.g., 
‘women’, ‘students’; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) and identification with the smaller, 
“politicized” subgroup or social movement organization (e.g., ‘feminists’, ‘protest movement 
against tuition fees’) has demonstrated that identification with the politicized group is a 
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stronger predictor of engagement than identification with the disadvantaged group more 
generally.  
Emotion, efficacy and identity should not be viewed as competing explanations of 
collective action. In fact, recent work has combined these factors in integrative models. For 
example, van Zomeren et al. (2004) demonstrated that emotion and efficacy perceptions are 
two distinct but complementary routes to collective action. In a further extension of this dual 
pathway model that incorporates the three main social-psychological perspectives on 
collective action, van Zomeren et al. (2008) proposed the social identity model of collective 
action and provided meta-analytic evidence that all three predictors had causal effects on 
collective action, and that identity can also be conceived of as a more distal predictor because 
it both empowers individuals and amplifies injustice perceptions and group-based emotions 
(see Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012, for an alternative integration). Although much has 
been learned about the role of psychological factors in collective action and social 
movements, a number of important gaps in the literature remain. First, we address the issue of 
when and why people opt to engage in illegal and violent forms of action.  
PREDICTING RADICAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
There has been a resurgence of interest in the factors underlying violent forms of 
political action since the events of 9/11. For years, psychological approaches to work on 
terrorism had been dominated by facile attempts of explanation (e.g., terrorism as arising out 
of psychopathology or particular personality profiles) with little empirical support (see 
Horgan, 2014, for a review). Recent thinking in psychology has, however, moved away from 
the view of terrorism as a “syndrome” and has started to view it as a method of social and 
political influence (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). Similarly, sociological work has explicitly 
made the point that terrorism is essentially a form of collective action which can be analyzed 
using the existing conceptual tools from the social movement literature (see de la Corte, 2007; 
Oberschall, 2004; Tilly, 2004). While factors determining the choice of tactics have been 
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studied using social movements as the level of analysis (e.g., Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), 
systematic work on the psychological underpinnings of support for and engagement in 
different types of action was, until recently, virtually non-existent. In order to shed light on 
the psychological correlates of different forms of action, we applied Wright et al.’s (1990) 
useful distinction between normative (i.e., action that conforms to the norms of the existing 
social system, such as political participation or peaceful protest) and non-normative (i.e., 
action that violates these rules, such as violence and terrorism) collective action in our 
research. It is important to emphasize that this distinction refers explicitly to the norms of the 
dominant social system (e.g., laws and regulations) rather than to the norms of the (sub-)group 
undertaking the action (note that we will use the terms “non-normative” and “radical” 
synonymously in this review). 
Tausch et al. (2011) proposed that normative and non- normative forms of protest 
follow from different sets of appraisals of the political situation and tested two key ideas: 
First, they proposed that different “negative” emotions are at the heart of these different forms 
of action. Specifically, they predicted that while anger should be related to normative action, 
it is the emotion of contempt that should predict support for and willingness to engage in non-
normative action. This argument follows from work on the functional differences between 
anger and contempt (Averill, 1983; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Weber, 2004). This approach 
views anger as a constructive emotion that functions to correct wrongdoing and uphold 
accepted standards of behaviour. From this point of view, expressions of anger can serve to 
change an offenders’ behaviour and force them to conform to standards of conduct, 
maintaining positive social relations in the long run. Consistent with this view, work on the 
function of emotion in the interpersonal domain has shown that anger is characterized by 
short-term attack responses but long-term reconciliation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Weber, 
2004). We reasoned that anger might function similarly in the political domain, where it 
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should motivate action that would express discontent and demand a change of course without 
breaking society’s rules and thus allow for reconciliation in the long term.  
On the surface, this might be counterintuitive, in particular in the light of work on the 
frustration-aggression link (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989), which has generally suggested a link 
between anger and aggressive and destructive behaviour. Angry outbursts can certainly have 
negative consequences for social relations and this applies also to behaviour in the political 
domain where, for example, provocations by the police during a protest might result in 
aggressive behaviour such as the destruction of property. We would like to emphasize, 
however, that our predictions do not refer to the negative arousal associated with spontaneous, 
in situ anger and frustration and the impulsive aggressive behaviours that follow, but with 
longer-lasting feelings toward a particular political issue or offender (more closely linked to 
the appraisal component of anger) and the resulting instrumental, premeditated actions. This 
is in line with the social-constructivist theory of emotion (Averill, 1983), which emphasizes 
socially shared and transmitted rules or scripts that specify appropriate causes of anger 
(intentional wrongdoing or wrongdoing due to carelessness) and anger-related responses 
(nonhostile responses to serve to correct wrongdoing and reassert widely accepted standards 
of conduct; see Weber, 2004, for evidence).  
Contempt often co-occurs with anger (see Fischer & Roseman, 2007), but has distinct 
characteristics and social functions. While anger tends to be action-focused, contempt is a 
“globalist” emotion (Bell, 2013) that is elicited when the reprehensible behaviour of another 
is perceived as stable and out of one’s control (i.e., it is associated with negative dispositional 
attributions of the offending behaviour) and thus results in the derogation of the offender 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Rather than enabling reconciliation, contempt motivates 
psychological disengagement from the object of contempt, who will be treated with less 
respect and consideration in the future (Haidt, 2003). In intergroup relations, contempt has 
been shown to predict outgroup dehumanization (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008), 
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which can legitimate extreme actions (see Staub, 1990). In the political domain, it is possible 
that people experience what Miller (1995) termed “upward contempt”; that is, contempt 
experienced by citizens toward the political elites that can involve a sense of moral 
superiority. For example, a government which is viewed as illegitimate and not representing 
citizens’ interests (e.g., such as Mubarak’s former regime in Egypt), as engaging in immoral 
activities like supporting an illegitimate war, or as violating central values such as the right to 
a free education, is likely to be viewed with contempt, in particular when attempts to 
challenge the government’s course of action appear hopeless. 
Given that feelings of contempt are associated with a lack of reconciliation intentions, 
denial of respect, and moral exclusion, it is likely that, in the presence of an injustice or a 
threat, contempt can result in particularly hostile reactions. This is because attack tendencies 
are accompanied by extreme derogation and are not held in check by a desire to preserve 
social relationships (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). A psychological distancing from, and moral 
exclusion of, the object of contempt (which, in the context of political action could be the 
government, police, or an offending outgroup) further undermines the need to adhere to social 
norms and moral standards. Applying these ideas to collective action, Tausch et al. (2011) 
hypothesized that anger would be most predictive of normative action, which is aimed at the 
improvement of social relations within a given system. Contempt, on the other hand, should 
most strongly predict non-normative forms of action that challenge the legitimacy of the 
current social system.  
The second key idea tested in this research concerns the relationship between efficacy 
and normative vs. non-normative action. As described above, (normative) collective action 
tends to be driven by a strong sense of efficacy (i.e., the belief that one’s group has the ability 
to effect the desired social change). Conversely, Tausch et al. (2011) proposed that non-
normative actions are often driven by a sense of low efficacy. That is, non-normative action 
should occur when individuals feel that their group is powerless to address an injustice or 
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influence relevant political decisions. This might be because individuals feel that their group 
does not have access to the conventional channels of political influence (e.g., Wright, 2009; 
Wright et al., 1990), is marginalized in the existing political system (e.g., Schwarzmantel, 
2010), or is too disorganized or unsupportive of the cause (see van Zomeren et al., 2004). 
Such non-normative action does not represent an irrational strategy, but can be highly 
strategic (see Scheepers, Spears, Doosje & Manstead, 2006). For example, it can serve to 
influence wider public opinion (cf. Hornsey et al., 2006) or to provoke extreme counter-action 
that would unsettle the current political situation and thereby facilitate the desired goal in the 
long run (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Sedgwick, 2004). 
It should be noted that, in line with the dual pathway model of collective action (van 
Zomeren et al., 2004), Tausch et al.’s (2011) research treated emotions and efficacy as distinct 
“pathways” predicting collective action. However, as should be evident from our preceding 
discussion of the likely mechanisms involved in the emergence of normative and non-
normative action that the interrelations between the key variables are likely to be more 
complex and interactive. This is an issue to which we will return in the general discussion. 
Furthermore, in line with previous work on the dual pathway model we focused primarily on 
general group efficacy and did not consider more specific forms of efficacy (e.g., response 
efficacy). We will discuss possible extensions of our approach in our section on directions for 
future research. 
Tausch et al. (2011) tested their key predictions regarding anger, contempt and 
efficacy as predictors of normative and non-normative action using survey data from three 
diverse contexts. Study 1 (N = 332) was conducted in the context of student protests against 
tuition fees in Germany. The 2005 ruling of the German high court to overturn a ban on 
tuition fees was met with student protests across the country. In Hessen, where the study was 
conducted, tuition fees were introduced in October 2006. Students engaged in a variety of 
collective actions to oppose the fees, ranging from relatively normative actions such as 
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participating in demonstrations to more radical actions such as blocking highways and 
destroying property (see Der Spiegel, 2007). The link to our online survey was sent to a 
number of large student email lists at several universities in Hessen in January 2008, when a 
law suit against the constitutionality of tuition fees was underway and the future of tuition 
fees in Hessen was still uncertain.  
The survey included measures of the perceived injustice of tuition fees (e.g., the view 
that the introduction of tuition fees is unfair), anger about the introduction of the fees (e.g., 
“the introduction of tuition fees angers me”), contempt toward advocates of the fees (e.g., “I 
disdain people who advocate tuition fees”), the perceived efficacy of the student movement to 
enforce the abolition of fees (e.g., “I think that students can stop the introduction of tuition 
fees”), all measured using 7-point scales ranging from 1 (=strongly disagree) to 7 (=strongly 
agree), and likelihood of to participating in a variety of collective actions (1 = very unlikely, 7 
= very likely). A principal components analysis revealed three separate components of 
collective action intentions: relatively normative actions (participating in discussion meetings, 
participating in plenary meetings, writing flyers, signing a complaint against the 
unconstitutionality of tuition fees, street theatre, demonstrations; M = 4.20, SD = 1.80), non-
violent non-normative actions (disturbing events, blocking university buildings, blocking a 
highway; M = 2.93, SD = 1.78) and violent non-normative actions (throwing stones or bottles, 
arson attacks on university buildings, arson attacks on private property, attacks on the police, 
attacks on responsible persons; M = 1.13, SD = .61).  
We tested our hypotheses (in this and the subsequent two studies) using multiple 
regressions treating action intentions (or support) as the criterion variables, injustice and 
efficacy perceptions as predictors, and emotions (anger and contempt) as mediators. As the 
distribution of responses for violent non-normative actions deviated substantially from 
normality, we used the bootstrapping method to calculate standard errors and confidence 
intervals (see Tausch et al., 2011, for more details). We used Mplus 5.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 
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1998-2007) to be able to estimate all relevant model parameters in one step. Results are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
----Figure 1 about here---- 
As can be seen in Figure 1, injustice appraisals predicted both anger and contempt and 
were also a significant direct predictor of normative action tendencies. Anger was related to 
normative and non-violent non-normative, but not violent non-normative, action. Additional 
tests comparing the relative strength of paths indicated that the more extreme the action was, 
the less predictive was anger. Thus, it seems that for anger there was a continuous diminution 
of predictive power as a function of the extremity of the criterion action. Overall, this is in 
line with current thinking that anger is a constructive emotion that is likely to result in actions 
that are bound to conventional norms and allow for reconciliation (Averill, 1983; Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007). The reverse was found for contempt: The more extreme the action, the 
greater was its predictive power. Specifically, contempt was a significant predictor of 
likelihood of engaging in violent, non-normative action, but was unrelated to the other 
outcome variables. Thus it seems that contempt, which is often associated with 
dehumanization and moral exclusion of the object of contempt and a lack of reconciliatory 
intentions, contributes particularly toward more extreme collective action.  
The results of this study also provided evidence that efficacy is positively related to 
normative action but negatively related to non-normative action. The expected negative link 
between efficacy and non-normative action was, however, only evident for violent non-
normative actions. Overall, it seems that in this study the non-violent, non-normative action 
category was predicted by similar factors as for normative action, namely anger (albeit to a 
lesser degree) and high efficacy. Non-violent, non-normative actions therefore seemed to 
present a ‘middle category’ between clearly normative and clearly non-normative action. It is 
possible that, in the context of that particular time, actions such as blocking streets and 
buildings were seen as legitimate and fairly normative strategies because many students 
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engaged in these activities. Note also that the variance explained varies substantially across 
outcome measures, ranging from 7% for violent, non-normative action to 50% for normative 
actions. This is likely to be due to differences in the distributions of these variables. While 
only a very small proportion of respondents reported that they were willing to engage in 
violence, support for normative action was overall much higher and more variable. 
Furthermore, the amount of explained variance for normative action was overall much higher 
in this study than that for any of the other variables in the studies reported below. This is 
possibly due to the fact that the data for the present study were collected while the struggle 
against tuition fees was still very active and the questionnaire particularly timely and 
meaningful for respondents. 
Study 2 (N = 156) examined these hypotheses further, this time in a different cultural 
context and an environment of enduring inequality and violent intergroup conflict, and in 
relation to a different set of criterion variables. The respondents in this study were Muslims in 
India, who are among the most disadvantaged communities in the country. A survey 
distributed among Muslim students during several lectures at Aligarh Muslim University 
assessed perceptions of ingroup disadvantage (“I often think that Hindus are favoured and 
Muslims disadvantaged in India”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), anger (e.g., “To 
what extent do you feel angry when thinking about the disadvantaged status of Muslims in 
India?”) and contempt (“To what extent do you feel contemptuous when thinking about the 
disadvantaged status of Muslims in India?”; 1 = not at all; 5 = extremely), the perceived 
efficacy of Muslims in addressing disadvantage (“Muslims can together overcome their 
difficulties”, 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), support for policies that would 
improve the situation of Muslims in India (representing a normative form of action; e.g., “To 
what extent do you support job reservation policies for Muslims?”, 1 = strongly reject, 5 = 
strongly support; M = 3.94, SD = .83) and support for violence, using a scale adopted from 
Hayes and McAllister (2005; e.g., “In general, I have sympathy for some Muslim groups’ 
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reasons to resort to violent means in general, even though I do not condone the violence 
itself”; 1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; M = 2.97, SD = 1.04). The results of this 
study are shown in Figure 2. 
----Figure 2 about here---- 
Appraisals of disadvantage significantly predicted both anger and contempt. The 
difference between the relations of anger with non-normative and anger with normative action 
approached significance, but anger was overall not significantly related to policy support. The 
latter finding is not surprising and is likely due to the nature of the dependent measure, which 
assessed attitudinal support for an action taken by the government (which may be seen as an 
outgroup rather than ingroup collective action). As predicted, however, contempt was a 
significant predictor of support for non-normative action. Interestingly, contempt was also 
negatively related to support for government policies. As noted earlier, contempt is an 
emotion that implies psychological distancing from its object. Thus, it seems that when 
contempt is felt in relation to a political issue, this emotion might be associated with a 
distancing from the political system and lack of endorsement for actions taken by the 
dominant group. There was also only limited support for the efficacy hypothesis. Although 
one would not expect efficacy to be related to support for government policies, which do not 
represent an action taken by the ingroup, the expected negative relation between efficacy and 
support for violence was not significant. Follow-up analyses, which revealed a negative 
relation between efficacy and support for non-normative action only for one of the two items, 
suggest that this might be due to the nature of the measure, specifically the fact that the target 
of violence was not specified. Note that the variance explained by this model was 11% for 
policy support and 16% for support for violence. 
The final study reported by Tausch et al. (2011) examined the role of the target of 
violence more specifically by distinguishing between violence against military targets and 
violence against civilians. This study was conducted in a highly contentious context, 
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examining British Muslims’ support for a variety of actions in opposition to British foreign 
policy. There has been an increase in political activism among British Muslims around issues 
of social justice and British foreign policy, in particular the Iraq war (see Briggs, 2010). The 
so-called ‘war on terror’ is also assumed to be among the key drivers of the recruitment of a 
small minority of British Muslims to extremist groups and was cited as the major reason for 
the 7/7 London bombings (e.g., CBS, 2006). Some findings also suggest that a sizable 
minority of British Muslims felt that the 7/7 bombings were justified (e.g., GfK NOP, 2006). 
The survey was administered online. Respondents (N = 466 British Muslims) were 
recruited using an advertisement on Facebook which targeted Facebook users living in the 
United Kingdom, aged 18 years or older, who had terms related to Islam or Muslims (e.g., 
Islam, Muslims, Arabic, Bangladesh) in their profile. The questionnaire included assessments 
of the perceived injustice of British foreign policy (“To what extent do you think that 
Britain’s role in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegitimate?”) and anger (e.g., “To what 
extent do you feel anger when thinking about British foreign policy towards Muslim countries 
in the recent past?”) and contempt (“To what extent do you feel contempt when thinking 
about British foreign policy towards Muslim countries in the recent past?”) in relation to this 
issue (all measured on scales ranging from ; 1 = not at all, 7 = extremely). It also included a 
measure of respondents’ sense of political efficacy (“I feel that I am quite well represented in 
our political system”; 1=strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) rather than a more general 
group efficacy measure. Political efficacy is a theoretical concept in political science that 
represents citizens' trust in government and the belief that they are able to influence political 
affairs. It therefore represents a measure of efficacy that relates more specifically to actions 
within the current political system. The main criterion variables in this study were normative 
collective action intentions (e.g., “How willing are you to participate in a peaceful public rally 
in order to change British foreign policy towards Muslim countries?”, 1 = not at all willing; 9 
= very willing) and support for violence against military targets and against civilian targets. 
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The scales measuring support for violence consisted of a number of items (see Table 1), 
which were standardized and averaged to form composites of support for violence against 
military and civilian targets respectively.  
----Table 1 about here ---- 
In addition, this study included a measure of participants’ likelihood to vote in the next 
general election (1 = not at all likely, 7 = very likely). Although voting intention is not directly 
or exclusively related to attempts to influence foreign policy, it can be viewed as system-
supporting form of political action, therefore allowing us to test whether the negative link 
between contempt and support for government policies observed in Study 2 is replicable. This 
would provide more direct evidence that contempt is associated with disaffection with, and 
distancing from, the political system. The results are summarized in Figure 3. 
----Figure 3 about here ---- 
  Injustice appraisals again predicted both anger and contempt, as well as (directly) 
normative collective action. In addition, there was a significant negative relation between 
political efficacy and anger, suggesting that people who feel that they are well represented in 
the existing political system are less likely to feel angry about British foreign policy. 
Consistent with previous research, anger predicted willingness to engage in normative 
collective action, but was also related to support for violence against military targets, but not 
violence against civilian targets. Contempt predicted support (or at least less opposition) for 
violence against both military and civilian targets. There was also a negative relation between 
contempt and voting intention, providing additional evidence for the idea that contempt in 
response to an injustice committed against the ingroup may be accompanied by a distancing 
from the political system. Political efficacy was, as in previous research, a positive predictor 
of normative collective action intentions and voting intention. In line with our hypothesis, 
political efficacy was negatively related to support for action against military targets. This 
finding indicates that those who have little faith that they can influence government decisions 
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are more likely to support violence. There was, however, no relation between political 
efficacy and attitudes towards violence against civilians. This could be because of restricted 
variance for this variable, but also because other factors, such as adherence to an extremist 
ideology, played a stronger role. Note that the variance explained by this model was 19% for 
normative collective action, 8% for voting intentions, 22% for support for violence against 
military targets, and 5% for violence against civilians. The relatively small amount of 
variance explained in support for violence against civilians is certainly due to the overall very 
low level of support/high level of opposition. The comparatively small amount of explained 
variance for voting intentions is likely to be due to the fact that most of the explanatory 
variables specifically are related to foreign policies, whereas voting is not. 
Taken together, these studies support our proposition that different sets of appraisals 
and emotional responses underlie support for, and willingness to engage in, more radical, non-
normative forms of collective action. The findings underline the importance of extending 
current theoretical models of collective action to allow for the prediction of a range of 
different forms of action. However, as discussed above, the relations between the variables in 
our tested models are likely to be more complex. We will address this issue in the general 
discussion. We now turn to our second proposition, namely that participation in collective 
action feeds back into its psychological antecedents. 
DYNAMIC PROCESSES IN COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Imagine you are participating in a demonstration and chanting slogans in a group, or 
sitting on a highway as part of a human blockade while car drivers shout at you, or that you 
are pushed back by the police while trying to march toward government buildings. It is 
evident that participating in collective action can arouse strong emotions and should have a 
psychological impact on individuals. For instance, anti-fascist protesters are likely to feel 
pride when they have successfully blocked a Nazi demonstration or they are likely to feel 
anger towards the police if the police prevent their blockade. However, there is relatively little 
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research on how protest affects individuals and how experiences at a demonstration feed back 
into activists’ motivation to participate in future collective action (e.g., Louis, 2009; Wright, 
2009; but see Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005). In this section we focus on the psychological 
outcomes of protest and present a dynamic perspective by demonstrating that activists’ 
motivations to engage in future protest depend on how they experienced the preceding protest. 
First, we introduce a distinction between self-directed and outgroup-directed emotions 
as outcomes of collective action participation, and present research examining how protest 
affects our self-directed and outgroup-directed emotions and how these emotions motivate 
future collective action (Becker, Tausch & Wagner, 2011a). Second, we present research 
regarding the emotional responses to success and failure of protest and demonstrate how these 
specific emotional responses affect activists’ intentions to engage in future collective action 
(Tausch & Becker, 2013). Third, we return to the distinction between normative and non-
normative collective action and present a study that examined what happens when activists 
who engage in non-normative efforts designed to bring about social change on behalf of their 
group find themselves at odds with ingroup norms on how best to achieve social change 
(Becker, Tausch, Spears & Christ, 2011b). 
Self-directed and Outgroup-directed Emotions as Predictors of Future Action? 
Prior research on psychological outcomes of collective action revealed that collective 
action participation can be beneficial: for instance, Boehnke and Wong (2011) examined the 
long-term development of worries among peace movement activists compared to non-
activists. Results of a longitudinal study demonstrated that although activists belonging to a 
peace movement worried more about global issues such as environmental destruction, they 
worried less about their personal problems such as being unattractive, becoming the victim of 
a violent crime and their own and their parent’s death) than non-activists did.  
Moreover, activism is positively correlated with life satisfaction and positive affect 
(Klar & Kasser, 2009) and can lead to social cohesion and a positive emotional climate (Páez, 
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Basabe, Ubillos & Gonzáles-Castro, 2007; Rimé, 2007). However, evidence for effects of 
emotional experiences on activists’ motivation to engage in future protest is limited. Prior 
work has also typically focused on self-directed emotions (personal well-being) and has not 
considered group-based emotions (e.g., feelings toward the ingroup and outgroup). Thus, it is 
intriguing to know what kind of feelings activists experience and whether or not their 
emotional reactions can explain why they continue to engage in protest. 
From the perspective of the catharsis hypothesis, collective action participation should 
present an opportunity to vent anger (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer & Sears, 1939). From 
this point of view, activists should experience less negative emotion (e.g., less anger) after 
they have participated in protest. However, social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) suggest that collective action 
participation heightens the salience of one’s ingroup, of the antagonistic outgroup, the 
perception of injustice and the experience of corresponding emotions. From this point of 
view, feelings of anger should increase as a result of collective action participation, 
particularly when one’s ingroup is directly faced with the opponent outgroup (Drury & 
Reicher, 2005, 2009). According to the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour 
(e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998), actions of one 
party involved in a conflict can affect subsequent actions of the other party. For example, the 
police (as a powerful outgroup) often view activists as potentially dangerous and treat a 
heterogeneous crowd as a homogeneous, dangerous entity. By being (illegitimately) treated as 
such, the group prototype changes and the crowd forms a homogenous group united against 
the outgroup and confrontation becomes normative. Thus, group members can be radicalized, 
which usually heats up “negative” conflict-related emotions (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher, 
1996). From a social identity perspective, it is, however, also possible that individuals 
perceive themselves more positively, and are happy and proud that they supported their 
ingroup via collective action participation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, there are arguments 
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for both assumptions, that individuals can experience more positive emotions after protest, but 
also that collective action participation can intensify conflict-related emotions such as anger. 
In order to integrate these predictions, Becker et al. (2011a) distinguished between self-
directed emotions (emotions experienced as an individual) and group-based emotions 
(emotions experienced as a group member against an outgroup). The main prediction is that 
collective action participants can simultaneously experience both, “positive” self-directed 
emotions (e.g., feeling good about oneself) and “negative” out-group directed emotions (e.g., 
feeling angry at the outgroup, e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith, Seger & Mackie, 
2007) as a result of protest participation.  
Importantly for the current review, Becker et al. (2011a) also examined whether self-
directed and outgroup-directed emotions predicted individuals’ motivation to participate in 
future protest. This question is important in order to understand how long-term protest works 
and why many activists participate in protest over extended periods of time. Arguments can 
be found that self-directed as well as outgroup-directed emotions could predict protest. Based 
on the finding that collective action participation can be predicted by a motivation for self-
enhancement (Tropp & Brown, 2004) and is associated with psychological well-being (Klar 
& Kasser, 2009) and happiness (Boehnke & Wong, 2011), it is reasonable to assume that 
activists continue to engage in actions because they anticipate experiencing positive emotions. 
Similarly, it is possible that activists are motivated to continue their actions because of a 
heightened salience of group-based disadvantage and corresponding negative outgroup-
directed emotions. Becker et al. (2011a) examined the relative importance of self-versus 
outgroup-directed emotions as possible motivators for future action intentions. Participants 
were N = 101 students at a German university (Becker et al., 2011a; Study 2). They were 
recruited by research assistants in front of university buildings. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of five conditions. They participated alone (not in groups). In the 
experimental condition (collective action against the government), participants were informed 
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that they could participate in protest against the government in Hessen and requested to read 
an unfriendly protest note against the government as loudly as possible and to blow into a 
whistle as long and loudly as possible while being recorded. It was explained that they would 
collect 1000 voices and whistles of Marburg’s students to send to the government of Hessen 
as a cumulative audio-message in the name of students.  
Four control conditions were added to this experimental condition. Students in the first 
control condition read about protests in the past against the government. This was exactly the 
same campaign as described in the experimental condition. We reasoned that simply reading 
about protest would not affect outgroup-directed emotions to the same extend as really 
engaging in collective action. Students in the second control condition engaged in collective 
action directed at another target group. This condition was identical to the experimental 
condition and included reading and blowing a whistle; however, the collective action was 
directed at the city council of a neighbouring city that manages a waste transfer station. We 
thought that engagement in protest against another target group would not increase 
participants’ intentions to engage in future action against the government. Moreover, 
outgroup-directed emotions that target the government should not be affected by participating 
in this alternative protest, whereas we reasoned that self-focused emotions would be equally 
affected in both collective action conditions as a consequence of doing something good for 
the ingroup. Students in the third control condition read about past protests against the 
alternative target group. Finally, a fourth baseline control group was added that directly 
answered the dependent variables without any experimental manipulation. All participants 
answered measures of outgroup-directed anger (e.g., “As a student, I feel anger towards the 
government in Hessen”), self-directed positive emotions (e.g., “I feel happy”; 0 = disagree 
strongly, 6 = agree strongly) and future collective action intentions (e.g., they were asked to 
indicate how likely they would be to take part in a demonstration in the case of a planned 
reintroduction of tuition fees; 1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Results indicated that 
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participants in both collective action conditions experienced increased levels of self-directed 
positive emotions. However, only students who engaged in collective action against the 
government experienced increased levels of outgroup-directed anger, compared to the control 
conditions. Importantly, the results indicated that outgroup-directed anger, but not self-
directed positive emotions, explained why collective action participation results in an 
increased motivation to engage in future protest. Thus, this work replicates prior work by 
showing that collective action participation can increase self-directed positive emotions (e.g., 
Boehnke & Wong, 2011; Klar & Kasser, 2009), but extends prior work by showing that it can 
also increase “negative” emotions that are directed at the outgroup. Thus, positive and 
negative emotions can be experienced at the same time – albeit directed at different targets 
(self vs. outgroup). Crucially, however, self-directed emotions did not predict future collective 
action participation. Instead, it was out-group directed anger that motivated future action. 
What has not been examined in this work, however, is the role of ingroup-related emotions. 
We will discuss a number of questions and hypotheses with regard to this issue in the general 
discussion. It is, for example, likely that particularly ingroup pride motivates future action. 
We consider the role of pride in more detail in the next section. 
Emotional Reactions to Success and Failure Can Motivate Future Collective Action 
One of the defining features of collective action is that it is goal-oriented and, like any 
goal-oriented behaviour, is accompanied by successes and (probably more frequently) 
setbacks and failures. In order to understand how outcomes of collective action affect 
perseverance and continued engagement among activists, another line of our work integrated 
current work on collective action with theoretical thinking on the motivational role of 
achievement emotions (e.g., Pekrun & Stephens, 2010; Weiner, 1985). Achievement emotions 
include any emotions that are either directly tied to achievement-related activities (e.g., 
enjoyment during an activity) or outcomes (e.g., the pride and hope resulting from success, 
the shame and frustration resulting from failure; see Pekrun & Stephens, 2010). Which 
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specific emotions are experienced, and to what intensity, depends on both personal factors 
(e.g., the importance of a domain) and appraisals of the causal factors underlying success or 
failure, such as locus of control (internal vs. external), controllability, and expected stability 
(Weiner, 1985). Furthermore, specific achievement emotions determine future behaviour. For 
example, shame in response to failure is likely to result in withdrawal, while guilt is likely to 
increase effort in the future (Weiner, 1985).  
Prior to our research, theory on achievement emotions had only been applied in sports 
and educational settings. In an initial study using this theoretical framework in the context of 
collective action, Tausch and Becker (2013) examined the motivational role of pride about the 
success of collective action and anger in response to its failure. We hypothesized, first, that 
the extent to which people experience achievement emotions would depend on their level of 
identification with the social movement and, second, that pride about success and anger about 
failure would both increase commitment to collective action. While we expected anger (an 
activating emotion in response to nonattainment of a subjectively important goal that is 
associated with external blame for failure) to directly predict willingness to engage in more 
collective action, we expected pride about success to increase protest intentions via its effect 
on perceived efficacy. The latter hypothesis was derived from prior work on achievement 
emotions in education, which has indicated that pride increases students’ academic agency 
(Pekrun, Goetz, Titz, & Perry, 2002). Thus, pride experienced after successful collective 
action should intensify the belief that the group is efficacious and likely to succeed again, 
thereby motivating future action.  
To examine these ideas, Tausch and Becker (2013) were able to take advantage of a 
unique field situation in which collective action resulted in both a success and a failure. In the 
context of student protests against university tuition fees in Germany, we measured 
identification with the social movement, perceived efficacy, and collective action intentions at 
two time points. (Note that the first assessment uses data described in Study 1 of Tausch et al., 
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2011). Of 189 participants who agreed to take part in a second survey, 98 completed the 
survey at Time 2 (response rate = 52%). There were no systematic differences between those 
who dropped out and those who did not in terms of demographic variables or in terms of our 
key variables (identification, efficacy and action tendencies measured at Time 1). Between the 
first and second assessment, two events occurred: First, there was a change from a 
conservative to a center-left government and the center-left government abolished tuition fees. 
This was a clear success for the protest movement. This success, however, was followed by 
the second event, which can be conceptualized as a failure of the movement: A lawsuit 
against the constitutionality of tuition fees deemed tuition fees to be constitutional, 
threatening their potential reintroduction in the future. Thus, at Time 2, we measured both 
pride about the abolition of fees (“Thinking about the abolition of tuition fees fills me with 
pride”) and anger about the outcome of the lawsuit (e.g., “I’m angry about the rejection of the 
complaint of unconstitutionality”), in addition to again assessing efficacy perceptions and 
future action tendencies. The results of our longitudinal analysis (using structural equation 
modeling in Amos) are shown in Figure 4. Note that the panel design of this study allowed us 
to assess the effects of achievement emotions on action tendencies and efficacy over and 
above baseline levels of these variables, thus giving some insights into relative changes in 
these variables as a function of emotional reactions. 
----Figure 4 about here---- 
In line with expectations, Tausch and Becker (2013) found that the extent to which 
anger and pride were experienced depended on respondents’ level of identification with the 
protest movement. In addition, there was a significant path from efficacy at Time 1 to anger. 
This is in line with appraisal theories of emotion (see Mackie et al., 2000), which suggest that 
strength is an important appraisal in the emergence of anger. Also as expected, anger (about 
the movement’s failure) directly and positively predicted future action intentions. Moreover, 
pride (about the movement’s success) was a significant predictor of group efficacy, which in 
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turn predicted future action tendencies. Thus, pride exerted a significant indirect effect on the 
intention to engage in future action via raising perceived efficacy. This result is in line with 
recent theorizing on collective action suggesting that positive emotions are central to 
empowerment (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Furthermore, this work illustrates that movements do 
not have to be successful to guarantee perseverance and continued engagement: Anger 
experienced in relation to the non-attainment of a collective goal can be harnessed to mobilize 
further action.  
Effects of Participating in Radical Collective Action on Identification and Future Action 
The last two sets of studies discussed above examined psychological consequences of 
normative collective action and how these outcomes affect activists’ motivation to participate 
in future collective action. What has not been studied so far are the consequences of engaging 
in non-normative collective action. Non-normative actions are costly given that they are often 
illegal and risky. Furthermore, the “radical vanguard” of a movement is often not supported 
by large parts of their ingroup despite the fact that they engage in costly actions for their 
ingroup’s sake. Thus, in the final research on consequences of collective action participation 
presented here (Becker et al., 2011b) we investigated the psychological consequences of 
action in activists who engaged in radical collective action as a function of whether or not 
they were supported by their ingroup. This research builds on the distinction between 
identification with the disadvantaged group more generally (the broader group, e.g., students, 
women, LGBT people) and identification with a more politicized group (“politicized” 
identification with a social movement organization, e.g., protest movement against tuition 
fees, feminists, gay movement; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) discussed in the introduction. As 
noted above, politicized identification is a better predictor of collective action participation 
than is identification with the broader group (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; see also van Zomeren 
et al., 2008). In order to contribute to the understanding of how and why social movements 
emerge and split, we also tested the reverse causal relation, i.e., whether engagement in 
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normative and non-normative collective action affected activists’ identification with the 
broader group and politicized identification. We expected that while participation in 
normative collective action might increase identification with the broader and politicized 
subgroup, participation in non-normative collective action (when it is not supported by the 
majority of the ingroup) should result in disidentification from the broader group, but 
increased identification with the politicized subgroup.  
The study was conducted in the same context of student protests against tuition fees as 
described above (Tausch et al., 2011; Tausch & Becker, 2013). Students completed an online 
questionnaire on two occasions, with a six month gap between Time 1 and Time 2. At both 
time points they completed measures of identification with the broader group (students), 
politicized identification (with the protest movement against tuition fees) and future action 
intentions. At Time 2 (June 2008), they were asked to indicate in which of several normative 
and non-normative actions they had participated since the previous measurement (January 
2008, e.g., to participate in a demonstration, to block a highway). Results of regression 
analyses controlling for initial levels of identification at Time 1 showed that the more students 
engaged in non-normative collective action, the lower their identification with the broader 
ingroup at Time 2. In contrast, participation in normative collective action did not affect 
identification with the broader group but increased politicized identification at Time 2. In an 
experimental follow-up study, we investigated whether it was really a perceived lack of 
ingroup support that drove disidentification among activists who engaged in non-normative 
action. In the first study of Becker et al. (2011b) we were not able to separate the effects of 
the type of action (peaceful versus radical) from the normativity of the action in this context 
(normative versus non-normative actions) because radical actions are non-normative and 
more likely not to be supported than peaceful actions. In the experimental follow-up we aimed 
to disentangle the effects of type of action from the normativity of the action on identification 
with the broader and politicized group. Given the obvious ethical issues involved in 
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examining the effects of non-normative behaviour, we drew on work examining the effects of 
imagined social situations to operationalize participation in different types of collective 
action. This work has generally demonstrated that imagined situations can have powerful 
consequences for cognition, affect and behavior that are similar to those of real-life situations 
(see Greenwood, 1989). Participants were asked to imagine participating in a demonstration 
(normative), blocking a highway with others (non-normative, non-violent), setting fire to a car 
with others (non-normative, violent), or were confronted with a control scenario (participation 
in the ‘public viewing’ of a football game together with others). Moreover, they were told that 
the ingroup on whose behalf they acted (students) either supported or did not support their 
action. The dependent variable was identification with the broader group (i.e., students) and 
identification with the politicized subgroup (i.e., protest movement against the introduction of 
tuition fees). As expected, students disidentified when they imagined that they were engaging 
in a non-normative action (blocking a highway, burning a car), but only when there was low 
support by fellow ingroup members. If there was high support for the action, students did not 
disidentify with their ingroup (see Figure 5). 
----Figure 5 about here---- 
Thus, these findings suggest that students who would consider themselves as most 
committed to the interests of their ingroup by engaging in radical strategies for change 
ironically disidentify from students as a group if their radical agenda is not shared by the 
majority of the ingroup. This result qualifies the idea that collective action always has in-
group strengthening effects (DeWeerd & Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; 
Reicher, 1996; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994) and 
highlights the importance of examining normative and non-normative action strategies as well 
as different levels of identification when considering the impact of collective action 
participation. 
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Together, these three papers (Becker et al., 2011a; 2011b; Tausch & Becker, 2013) 
amount to an important step forward in collective action research. They all take a dynamic 
perspective into account and help us to understand the perseverance but also the decline of 
social movements. They illustrate that emotions, as outcomes of collective action 
participation, play a crucial role in predicting future protest. Anger is a key emotion: Activists 
experiencing outgroup-directed anger or anger about the failure of a protest are more 
interested in future protest. Similarly, pride about the success of a protest motivates future 
intentions. Moreover, we demonstrated that changes in activists’ identification during 
(imagined) protest participation can radicalize protest intentions.  
Based on the finding of all three papers, we can gain some insights into how splits in 
social movements could be prevented. First, it would be important to avoid distinguishing 
“good” protesters from “bad” radicals. This happens quite often in real-life social movements 
and can lead to disidentification and the creation of subgroups (Becker et al., 2011b; Sani & 
Reicher, 1998). Instead, we illustrated that shared group-based anger towards an outgroup or 
outcome of protest is helpful for motivating protest. Finally, we demonstrated that whether the 
movement succeeds or fails is less important than how people respond to and frame these 
outcomes. If activists experience collective anger about a failure, it is likely that the 
movement will be strengthened and future protest stimulated. This is in line with qualitative 
research showing that a negative event (e.g., the cutting down of a tree that activists had tried 
to prevent) can strengthen activists’ collective identity and feelings of empowerment (Drury 
& Reicher, 2000). Next, we tackle the question of why protest is relatively rare despite the 
fact that social injustice is ubiquitous. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
If strong emotional reactions to injustices, strong group identification with a 
disadvantaged group, and the politicization of identities through identifying and blaming an 
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external agent are pivotal for collective action to emerge, what are the conditions under which 
these processes fail to take place?  
From a system justification perspective, people are motivated to believe that the 
society is fair and the social system is just (Jost & Banaji, 1994). If people believe the world 
is just (Lerner, 1980), they do not perceive a systematic discrimination of groups and in turn 
do not engage in collective action (e.g., Becker & Wright, 2011; Hafer & Olson, 1989; Jost et 
al., 2012). Thus, just-worlds-believers who are exposed to unfair events engage in a 
compensatory bias by expecting these negative events to be balanced or compensated by 
future positive events (Gaucher, Hafer, Kay & Davidenko, 2010; Kay & Jost, 2003; Stroebe, 
2013). Indeed, research revealed that people who believe in a just world were less interested 
in protest, because they are convinced that in a just world all will turn out well in the long run 
(all-will-be-well motivation, Stroebe, 2013). Similarly, social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) views social change to be a function of the permeability of group boundaries 
and the legitimacy and stability of intergroup status relations. Specifically, social identity 
theory states that when group boundaries are perceived to be permeable and/or intergroup 
status relations are perceived to be legitimate and stable, social change is unlikely. In order to 
further our understanding of why people fail to develop, or lose interest in, collective action 
we introduce two dilemmas that are faced by members of disadvantaged groups in the 
sections below. 
Alternative Opportunities for Identity Management  
The first dilemma refers to the pull of alternative action strategies that are available to 
members of disadvantaged groups to cope with a negative social identity. People experience a 
negative social identity when they are not able to positively distinguish their ingroup from 
relevant outgroups. If social comparison does not lead to a satisfactory social identity, 
individuals can find other ways to present their group in positive terms and to achieve positive 
distinctiveness. Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that members of 
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disadvantaged groups can improve their negative social identity a) through individual upward 
mobility (by leaving the group), b) by using “social creativity” strategies or c) by engaging in 
collective action. Because engagement in conflict can be costly, other options are often 
considered first. For example, social identity theory suggests that members of disadvantaged 
groups might adopt an individual mobility orientation and strive for personal advancement 
rather than collective action when they believe that they can cross group boundaries and 
easily enter the privileged group (see also Ellemers, 2001). Here we report evidence that some 
of the social creativity strategies proposed in social identity theory are also detrimental for 
maintaining a social change orientation. Three main strategies are distinguished: selecting a 
new comparison dimension (“they are rich, but we are happy”); engaging in downward 
comparison (“we are still better off than those who are unemployed”); and re-evaluating a 
negative group attribute by changing its valence in a positive way to render it less disparaging 
to the ingroup (“becoming rich is nothing desirable, we can be proud of being down-to-earth”, 
Galinsky, Hugenberg, Groom & Bodenhausen, 2003; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish & Hodge, 
1996). So far, social creativity and collective action have been perceived as collective 
strategies and as counterparts to individual mobility that does not aim to reach group-level 
improvement. However, social creativity and collective action have fundamentally different 
implications for the intergroup status relations. Social creativity strategies change aspects of 
the intergroup comparison in order to cope with social disadvantage. However, group-based 
inequality is not actively challenged. In contrast, collective action directly attempts to change 
the group’s position in the social hierarchy (Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke & Klink, 1998; 
Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe & McKimmie, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, if group 
members can establish positive distinctiveness by engaging in social creativity, the need for 
collective action to challenge the underlying hierarchical structure of inequality is reduced. 
Therefore, Becker (2012b) tested whether engaging in social creativity can have detrimental 
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effects for a disadvantaged group because it inhibits collective action for more structural 
equality. 
Specifically, Becker (2012b) predicted that engaging in two of the three social 
creativity strategies, namely engaging in downward comparison and selecting a new 
comparison dimension, should reduce collective action intentions. According to relative 
deprivation theory (e.g., Runciman, 1966), group members compare their outcomes with the 
outcomes of other groups and feel relatively disadvantaged when their group is worse off. 
This motivates group members to engage in action to improve their ingroup’s conditions (e.g., 
Dion, 1986; Tausch et al., 2011; Tyler & Smith, 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2004; Walker & 
Smith, 2002). Thus, if individuals engage in a downward comparison and learn that their 
group is not treated as badly as they had previously supposed (because the other group is still 
worse off), they should experience reduced levels of relative deprivation which in turn should 
decrease their interest in collective action.  
Moreover, most of the time, high status groups outperform low status groups on 
power-related dimensions (e.g., material wealth). If low status groups are motivated to 
compensate for this disadvantage on a complementary, power-unrelated dimension (e.g., 
honesty) in order to outperform the high status group in an intergroup comparison, low status 
group members may believe that the overall system is fair and legitimate, because it elicits the 
belief that every group possesses unique strengths and advantages that balance out their 
weaknesses and disadvantages (e.g., Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & Jost, 2003). For instance, the 
complementary representation of the poor as happy and honest and the rich as miserable and 
dishonest was found to increase system justification beliefs (among a convenient sample 
recruited around the Stanford University campus; Kay & Jost, 2003). Thus, selecting a new, 
complementary comparison dimension should heighten perceptions of legitimacy that in turn 
should reduce feelings of relative deprivation and collective action intentions.  
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Regarding the re-evaluation of the value or attribute of the comparison dimension, two 
different forms of re-evaluation need to be considered (Becker, 2012b). First, a positive 
redefinition of an externally imposed negative group attribute promotes a new perspective for 
the ingroup and seeks to change the way the ingroup is judged by society (Galinsky et al., 
2003; Jackson et al., 1996). The slogan “black is beautiful”, for instance, was used to mobilize 
ingroup members to engage in action (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Accordingly, a positive 
redefinition should not undermine collective action, but might even increase the motivation to 
fight against inequality among disadvantaged groups and should, therefore, not undermine 
protest intentions. 
Secondly, re-evaluation can also mean downplaying or rejecting the importance of the 
comparison attribute on which the outgroup’s superior status is based – to render the 
comparison as less harmful to the ingroup (e.g., Blanz et al., 1998; Mummendey et al., 1999). 
For example, a group that is disadvantaged on the economic dimension can downplay or 
devalue the value of material wealth by proclaiming that economic wealth is undesirable 
(Blanz et al., 1998). Becker (2012b) predicted that this second form of re-evaluation 
(downplaying the importance) should reduce collective action participation, because by 
downplaying an attribute people are less likely to feel disadvantaged in terms of this attribute. 
For example, on average, women have jobs with a lower status compared to men (e.g., 
Barreto, Ryan & Schmitt, 2009). Downplaying the importance of high status jobs for women 
should not be accompanied by feelings of relative deprivation or increased collective action 
intentions to promote women in leadership positions. In sum, downplaying the importance of 
an attribute should undermine collective action, whereas a positive re-evaluation of a 
negatively imposed group attribute should not undermine -- and might even enhance -- protest 
intentions. 
In order to test these hypotheses Becker (2012b, Study 3) carried out a study in which 
psychology students read that the Department of Psychology at their university would be 
34 
 
facing significant financial cuts. They were reminded that the Department of Psychology 
belonged to the Natural Sciences and informed that no other Natural Science department 
would be facing any cuts. Participants were told that in comparison with the other Natural 
Sciences, the Psychology department would be doing worse in terms of reputation, prestige, 
research and external funding, and graduates would lack a set of comparable skills. Next, 
students were assigned to one of five conditions (new comparison dimension, downward 
comparison, downplaying importance of attribute, positive redefinition, control). In the “new 
comparison dimension condition”, students were informed that Psychology students would 
have a higher life satisfaction and would be happier in life than students from other Natural 
Sciences. In the “downward comparison condition”, students were informed that conditions in 
the Department of Psychology would be excellent compared to the Social Science 
departments, which would face significantly greater cuts. In the “downplay condition”, 
participants were told that it would be negative if all students had the same homogeneous 
skills, that it would be negative to be only strong in research (which implies that everything 
else does not count) and to regard external funding as the key focus. In the “positive 
redefinition condition” participants were told that it would be positive if students did not have 
the same homogeneous skills, and that it would be positive not only to be strong in research 
(which implies that everything else does not count) and that it would be positive not to regard 
external funding as the key focus. In all four conditions, participants received questions 
asking for their agreement with the experimental texts. In the control condition, participants 
proceeded directly to the potential mediator variables, namely, relative deprivation (e.g., 
“Psychology students are treated unfairly”), collective self-esteem (e.g., “I feel good about the 
social group I belong to”), identification (e.g., “I feel a bond with students”), personal self-
esteem (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”), positive affect (e.g., “I am happy”) 
and the dependent variable (collective action intentions, e.g., “I would participate in a 
demonstration”). Results are displayed in Figure 6. 
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---Figure 6 about here --- 
As expected, compared to the control condition, participants reduced their intentions 
to engage in collective action when they used a new comparison dimension, when they 
engaged in downward comparison, and when they downplayed the importance of the 
attribute. However, there was no effect of the positive redefinition condition on collective 
action. Mediation analyses suggested that individuals in the conditions “new comparison 
dimension”, “downward comparison” and “downplay importance of the attribute” reduced 
their interest in collective action because they felt lower levels of relative deprivation 
compared to individuals in the control condition. All other potential mediators were not 
significant. 
In sum, these findings show that the pull of alternative identity management strategies 
that members of disadvantaged groups can use to cope with a negative social identity can be 
detrimental for the maintenance of a collective action orientation: Individuals can establish 
positive distinctiveness but simultaneously lose their interest in acting for more group-based 
social justice (Becker, 2012b). These results were not only valid using student samples, but 
were replicated for range of different disadvantaged groups (women, unemployed people, 
immigrants, middle class people, see Becker, 2012b). In these additional studies, Becker 
(2012b) looked at one single social creativity strategy per study, but the results were similar to 
those presented above: A downward comparison, a new comparison dimension and 
downplaying the importance of the relevant attribute undermined collective action intentions, 
whereas a positive reattribution did not affect collective action intentions. 
Alternative affective loyalties 
A second barrier to collective action can arise from having competing affective 
loyalties to the disadvantaged ingroup and the advantaged outgroup. A conflict of affective 
loyalties is particularly likely to emerge when members of disadvantaged groups have close, 
personal contact with members of the advantaged group (e.g., Jackman, 1994). In fact, recent 
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work has demonstrated that the main psychological outcomes of cross-group contact are at 
odds with the psychological requirements for a collective action orientation (Wright & 
Lubensky, 2009; Wright & Baray, 2012). As discussed above, research on the predictors of 
collective action has emphasized the importance of awareness of and emotional reactions to 
injustices (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008), the perceived 
permeability of group boundaries (Wright et al., 1990), strong identification with the 
disadvantaged group (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, 2004), as well as negative views of the 
advantaged group (e.g., blaming them for the inequality; see Simon & Klandermans, 2001) as 
predictors of engagement. It is well-established that cross-group contact has psychological 
consequences that are in direct opposition to these antecedents of collective action; contact 
results in greater awareness of commonalities and shared humanity (e.g., Tam et al., 2007), 
reduced importance of group identities (Brewer & Miller, 1984 but see Hewstone & Brown, 
2005), identification with a common identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), and more positive 
outgroup attitudes (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). While these consequences may promote 
more harmonious intergroup relations, they do not automatically translate into social justice 
and greater group equality.  
Positive contact with members of the advantaged group may in fact increase 
disadvantaged group members’ acceptance of a biased system and weaken their motivation to 
act collectively for equality. This has now been suggested in a series of recent studies which 
illustrate that positive cross-group contact with members of advantaged groups reduces 
collective action intentions and support for egalitarian policies among members of 
disadvantaged groups (e.g., Cakal, Hewstone, Schär & Heath, 2011; Dixon, Durrheim, & 
Tredoux, 2007; Saguy & Kteily, 2014; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Tausch, 
Saguy & Bryson, in press; Tropp, Hawi, van Laar & Levin, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). 
For instance Saguy et al. (2009) illustrated that commonality-focused cross-group contact 
produced expectations among low status group members that the high status group would 
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behave in a fair and egalitarian way – an expectation that was completely unrealistic as the 
high status group did not behave in an egalitarian manner. 
Why does cross-group contact undermine collective action intentions among 
disadvantaged group members? According to Jackman (1994), positive affect toward 
members of the advantaged group (e.g., outgroup friends) decreases perceived intergroup 
inequality (see also Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012) and decreases feelings of 
anger towards the outgroup (Tausch et al., in press). This likely happens to avoid the 
disapproval of outgroup friends, but may also be an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance: 
Having a friend in the very group that oppresses one’s ingroup should elicit feelings of 
cognitive dissonance in members of disadvantaged groups. This dissonance can be reduced by 
legitimizing intergroup inequality and ingroup disadvantage or by viewing the advantaged 
group as not responsible for inequality.  
Thus, perceptions of legitimacy play an important role in undermining collective 
action intentions. Upholding a perception of illegitimate ingroup disadvantage in cross-group 
contact situations seems to be necessary to maintain a collective action orientation among 
members of disadvantaged groups. How can cross-group contact situations be created to 
foster perceptions of undeserved disadvantage? The answer is by politicized communication 
about illegitimacy of intergroup inequality in contact settings (Becker, Wright, Lubensky & 
Zhou, 2013). Specifically, in an attempt to solve the dilemma between cross-group contact 
and collective action for members of disadvantaged groups, Becker et al. (2013) proposed that 
cross-group contact would not undermine (but might even enhance) collective action among 
disadvantaged groups when the contact partner from the advantaged group explicitly 
questions the legitimacy of her or his group’s privilege and clearly describes the intergroup 
inequality as illegitimate. Thus, if the advantaged-group contact partner is in favor of a 
redistribution of power/status and signals her or his approval for social change, members of 
disadvantaged groups should not experience any conflict in terms of anticipated disapproval 
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by their advantaged group friend and should therefore maintain or even increase their interest 
in collective action against the group their friend is part of. These expectations are based on 
the observation that not all members of advantaged groups defend their group’s privilege; 
some individuals actively question the legitimacy of social inequality and engage in 
solidarity-based collective action on behalf of disadvantaged groups (e.g., Iyer & Ryan, 2009; 
Subašić, Reynolds & Turner, 2008). Thus, Becker et al. (2013) tested whether cross-group 
contact with a more enlightened outgroup friend would not have a negative impact on 
maintaining a social change orientation.  
In order to test these hypotheses, Becker et al. (2013, Study 2) initiated cross-group 
contact between members of the two large universities in Vancouver: Simon Fraser 
University as the “lower status” university and the University of British Columbia as the 
“higher status” university. Participants were students from the lower-status university who 
had a friendly and enjoyable cross-group encounter with a student from the higher-status 
university, who was actually a confederate. The study was presented as study on memory. 
Participants first read three short news stories (one was about the unequal distribution of 
resources between the lower- and higher-status university) and were instructed to memorize 
the texts. In order to distract them before completing the memory test, they were asked to play 
some games together. These games were used to create positive cross-group contact. During 
the games the confederate offered standardized compliments in order to build feelings of 
closeness. Between the two games, the manipulation took place. There were three 
experimental conditions and a control condition. In the three experimental conditions 
(ambiguity, legitimacy, illegitimacy), the confederate said that she was from the higher-status 
university. She explained that she was taking a course at the lower-status university because 
she could not get into her desired course at the higher-status university. She added that the 
courses fill up quickly because the higher-status university is perceived to be the better 
school. In the ambiguity condition the confederate did not say any more about her opinion 
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regarding the status relation between the lower-status and higher-status university. In the 
legitimacy condition, the confederate added that it was fair that the higher-status university 
has advantages compared to the lower-status university. In the illegitimacy condition, she 
added that it was unfair that the higher-status university has these advantages. In the control 
condition, there was no cross-group contact (here, the confederate was from the lower-status 
university). The confederate said that she was a second year student, but could not get into 
one of her required courses, so she thought she would try Psychology. She also commented 
about courses filling really quick at the university and how she had to be flexible. Afterwards, 
participants played a second game together, completed the memory test, a measure of 
collective action intentions on behalf of the lower-status universities’ students and a measure 
of attitudes towards the confederate and towards the higher-status universities’ students in 
general. Finally, participants had the opportunity to take flyers regarding the issues they had just 
read about if they were interested in getting involved in protest. Participants could circle the 
number of flyers they wanted to distribute. Results are shown in Table 2.  
---Table 2 about here --- 
There was no difference between the four conditions in feelings of closeness with the 
confederate but, in line with the contact hypothesis, participants had more positive feelings 
towards the higher-status universities’ students in general in the three cross-group contact 
conditions compared to the non-cross-group contact control condition. Furthermore, compared to 
the control group, cross-group contact reduced collective action intentions and actual engagement 
in collective action (taking flyers) when the confederate said that it was fair that the lower-status 
university had some disadvantages (legitimate condition) as well as when she did not offer her 
opinion on this issue (ambiguous condition). However, as expected, when the confederate 
articulated her opinion that it was unfair that the lower-status university was disadvantaged 
compared to the higher-status university (illegitimate condition) intentions and engagement in 
collective action were not reduced.  
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Thus, both having friends in the advantaged group and engaging in collective action on 
behalf of one’s disadvantaged group reflect a dilemma faced by members of disadvantaged 
groups. These findings present a first solution to this dilemma by introducing a moderator that 
helps to explain when contact undermines collective action and when it does not. It seems to be 
important to focus on intergroup inequalities in cross-group contact situations and to talk about 
the illegitimacy of status differences. Although we did not directly test whether a suggested 
equality of status between both groups undermined collective action intentions, it is very likely 
that believing both groups would have the same status reduces collective action intentions among 
the disadvantaged group (for a critical discussion see Nagda & Gurin, 2006). 
INTEGRATION OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
We have noted three important gaps in the collective action literature: a) a 
predominant focus on relatively moderate and normative forms of protest and a lack of 
understanding of the psychological variables involved in radical action; b) a focus on 
developing predictive models at the expense of dynamic theories; and c) a relative lack of 
understanding of the operation of psychological boundaries to collective action and how they 
can be overcome. Using the social identity model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 
2008) as the (theoretical) springboard for our research, we have presented initial work 
addressing these three gaps. The key implication of the social identity model of collective 
action is that (politicized) identification, high levels of group efficacy and perceived injustices 
are unique drivers of collective action. Our additions to this general framework are visualized 
in Figure 7. 
---Figure 7 about here --- 
By explicitly distinguishing normative from non-normative (cf. Wright et al., 1990) 
forms of collective action, examining how collective action feeds back into its psychological 
antecedents, and exploring the factors that undermine interest in collective action and how 
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these can be overcome, the research reviewed here was able to provide a number of 
extensions and novel insights. 
First, we added the distinction between normative and non-normative action shown in 
Figure 7 and highlighted that these two forms of collective action are predicted by different 
emotions, and are differently predicted by perceived efficacy. While prior work (within social 
identity model of collective action and beyond) suggested that anger in response to injustices 
and high levels of perceived group efficacy predict engagement in collective action, we 
demonstrated that more radical, non-normative action is likely to emerge when protesters feel 
contempt rather than anger toward the opponent group or the political system more generally, 
when one’s group or social movement is viewed as weak rather than strong, and when people 
have a low sense of political efficacy (Tausch et al., 2011). Overall, these findings indicate 
that those who have little faith that they can influence governmental functioning and are 
disaffected from the political system, are more likely to support radical action such as 
violence.  
Second, we added several outcomes of collective action participation. We 
demonstrated that participation in collective action has implications for protesters’ emotions, 
efficacy beliefs, and identities, which in turn predict their motivation to continue protesting. 
Specifically, we illustrated that participation in normative collective action elicits positive 
self-directed emotions and negative outgroup-directed emotions. Only negative outgroup-
directed emotions--not the positive self-directed emotions--motivated activists to engage in 
future action (Becker et al., 2011a). Furthermore, we demonstrated that the experience of 
achievement emotions such as pride about a success, or anger about a failure of a movement 
enhanced activists’ motivation to participate in future action (Tausch & Becker, 2013). We 
also showed that participation in non-normative collective action that is not supported by the 
broader ingroup can lead to disidentification from this group (Becker et al., 2011b). Together 
the findings of these studies contribute new insights to the dynamic perspective on collective 
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action (Drury & Reicher, 2000; van Zomeren, Leach & Spears, 2010). It is important to note 
that recent developments of the social identity model of collective action also contain 
feedback loops (see van Zomeren et al., 2012). Although van Zomeren et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that identity bridges the injustice and efficacy explanations of collective action, 
recent research shows that efficacy also has a causal impact on identification by putting 
individuals’ identity into action (van Zomeren et al., 2010). We illustrated these dynamics 
with double-headed arrows within the key variables in Figure 7. 
Finally, we added research on barriers to collective action by introducing two 
dilemmas faced by members of disadvantaged groups. The first dilemma referred to the pull 
of alternative identity management strategies that members of disadvantaged groups can use 
to cope with a negative social identity. Prior work has illustrated that (the prospect of) 
individual upward mobility can inhibit group members’ interest in social change (e.g., 
Ellemers, 2001; Wright, 2001). We demonstrated that members of disadvantaged groups can 
also lose their interest in collective action for social change when they compare their ingroup 
with a higher status outgroup on an alternative, complementary comparison dimension on 
which their ingroup is superior (e.g., perceived warmth), when they compare their ingroup 
with a lower-status outgroup that is worse off (downward comparison), or when they 
downplay the importance of the attribute on which the high status group is superior. These 
effects were mediated by reduced levels of relative deprivation. The second dilemma referred 
to a conflict between alternative affective loyalties and a social change orientation that can 
evolve when members of disadvantaged groups have close, personal contact with one or more 
members of the advantaged group. Previous research indicated that intergroup contact can 
inhibit collective action among the disadvantaged (see Dixon et al. 2012, for a review). As an 
attempt to solve the dilemma between cross-group contact and collective action for members 
of disadvantaged groups, we highlighted the role of communication about perceptions of 
legitimacy of intergroup inequality. We presented e
43 
 
contact partner clearly describes the intergroup inequality as illegitimate, cross-group contact 
does not undermine participation in collective action (Becker et al., 2013).  
Although we have pointed out several extensions, the work presented in this review is 
only a starting-point for a more extensive program of research. Next we highlight the 
implications of our findings for future developments in the field, acknowledge limitations of 
our research, and suggest potentially fruitful directions for future research.  
IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
(1) Distinguishing normative from non-normative action. One of the most important 
implications of our work is that future developments in the field need to distinguish between 
normative and non-normative forms of protest. The importance of this distinction is 
emphasized not only in our findings that different sets of appraisals of the social context and 
qualitatively different emotional responses to injustices underlie support for, and willingness 
to engage in, radical, non-normative forms of collective action (Tausch et al., 2011), but also 
in the fact that participation in radical actions that receive varying levels of normative support 
have different psychological consequences which are likely to impact on the radicalization of 
subgroups within social movements (Becker et al., 2011b). A number of recent studies have 
already followed suit, investigating, for example, the effects of normative and non-normative 
collective action under varying political conditions on public opinion (Thomas & Louis, 
2014), how support for normative vs. non-normative action emerges in social interactions 
(Thomas, McGarty, & Louis, 2014), and how individual differences in regulatory focus and 
moral conviction impact on choice of action to protest against injustices (Zaal, van Laar, 
Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). These studies and the studies presented in this review 
demonstrate that it is much more challenging to examine non-normative collective action 
compared to normative collective action. Obviously there are severe ethical restrictions to ask 
individuals to engage in radical actions in a laboratory context. Therefore, we either assessed 
radical actions in self-reports or used an imagined scenario (Becker et al., 2011b). The 
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measurement of radical action could be improved in the future, for instance, by using quasi-
experimental designs in field research.  
As mentioned above, the distinction between normative and non-normative action 
refers to the norms of the dominant social system (e.g., laws and regulations; see Wright et al., 
1990). Our work thus far has been conducted exclusively in democratic, liberal and mostly 
Western societies where freedom of expression and the right to peaceful protest are crucial 
and protected by law. It is important to extend this work to other, less liberal societies to 
examine to what extent our findings generalize (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2015a, for a 
discussion of psychological predictors of protest in repressive contexts). For example, the 
same action (participating in a peaceful demonstration) that is a normative, “within-system” 
action and in some contexts, can be clearly non-normative and illegal in others (one only has 
to think about the treatment of peaceful protesters in Egypt or Russia). Thus, is participation 
in protest in such contexts predicted by contempt for the system rather than anger? 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that one would not necessarily expect 
individual-level action tendencies to clearly map onto the conceptual distinction between 
normative and non-normative action. Empirically, it is possible to obtain a variety of sub-
factors that vary in the extent of extremity and risk (e.g., illegal online vs. offline actions) and 
depend on features of the context. This was already evident in our research on anti-tuition fee 
protests in Germany, where a separate sub-factor that contained relatively peaceful but illegal 
actions such as blocking a highway emerged. This seemed to present a ‘middle category’ 
between clearly normative and clearly non-normative action and may have been viewed as a 
fairly normative strategy because many students engaged in these activities. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the conceptual distinction between normative from non-
normative action, when applied keeping contextual variations in mind, will allow us to better 
understand how people are radicalized. Our initial results indicate that radicalization is likely 
to involve the emergence of political contempt, the view that conventional means of 
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addressing injustices or a political goal are ineffective, and disidentification with the political 
mainstream. To further understand how radicalization happens, future research should devote 
attention to five other issues, which we now discuss. 
(2) Understanding the emergence of political contempt. One of the most consistent 
findings to date with respect to the distinction between normative and non-normative action is 
that political contempt – that is contempt for a political opponent or for the political system 
more generally – uniquely predicts support for radical action (see Becker et al., 2011a; Tausch 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, we also presented evidence that contempt negatively predicts 
actions that might be seen as system-supporting (support for government policies and voting). 
Thus, feelings of contempt in a political context might signal disaffection from the political 
system more generally. However, we have thus far not identified the unique predictors of 
political contempt. In fact, we know relatively little about the emotion of contempt (see Haidt, 
2003), or how it emerges in political contexts. The work presented here indicates that 
appraisals of injustice predict contempt, but they also (and even more strongly) predict anger. 
We therefore believe that it is imperative that future research further investigates the 
contextual and psychological factors that determine when and for whom injustice appraisals 
result in contempt.  
Some work suggests that anger and contempt (at least in interpersonal relations) can 
result from the very same incidents. What matters is whether and how similar instances were 
addressed in the past. Fischer and Roseman (2007) showed, for example, that contempt often 
arises when prior anger-arousing incidents went unresolved and there is a perceived lack of 
control over the other person. In the domain of group-based injustice and political action, this 
suggests that contempt may evolve when previous attempts to address an injustice turned out 
to be futile. This is surely what happened to many Muslims (and non-Muslims) after 
widespread collective action against the Iraq war was ignored by the political elite. This also 
suggests that the relations between the different variables in our model might in fact be 
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interactive. The model tested in Tausch et al.’s (2011) work was aimed at extending a recent 
model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004) and demonstrate that the “pathways” to 
engagement vary depending on the type of action. Thus, following this initial work, we 
conceptualized efficacy and injustice/emotion as independent predictors. We acknowledge, 
however, that this might be simplistic and suggest that future work directly examines the 
interactive effects of these variables. For example, it is conceivable that efficacy acts as a 
moderator of the effect of injustice appraisals on emotions, such that an injustice that people 
feel cannot be addressed results in contempt rather than anger. This would also be generally in 
line with appraisal theories of emotion which view a perceivers’ strength as an important 
appraisal that determine whether or not anger is experienced, as well as with work on the 
social-constructivist approach, which has demonstrated that the costs and benefits of 
emotional engagement determine anger expression (Weber, 2004). As discussed earlier, in the 
interpersonal arena contempt is typically associated with a lack of control over a person and 
the attribution of an offending behaviour to stable dispositions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). 
Thus, appraisals of control and, more specifically, the changeability of an offender or 
opponent, seem pivotal. Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, and van Zomeren (2014), for 
example, demonstrated that beliefs about the malleability of groups that are viewed as 
immoral increases normative collective action tendencies. While these authors did not assess 
emotions, it is conceivable that malleability beliefs increase anger and reduce contempt. 
However, there is also other research which implies that anger and contempt result 
from different forms of norm violation (e.g., violations of autonomy vs. community, 
respectively; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). It is likely that violations of human 
moral standards by the government or other powerful groups, such as violent suppression of a 
social movement or discounting numerous civilian casualties in war as ‘collateral damage’, 
provide a fertile ground for the development of political contempt.  
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Contempt typically goes hand in hand with viewing the object of contempt as in some 
way inferior. How can this be reconciled with emotions felt by a disadvantaged group toward 
an advantaged group or political elite? Supplementary analyses using additional measures 
collected as part of Study 1 in Tausch et al. (2011) provide some insight. Student participants 
in this study also indicated their perceived moral superiority over proponents of tuition fees. 
When this measure was included as a predictor in the model, it emerged as a strong predictor 
of contempt (β = .49, p <.001), but was unrelated to anger. This underlines the importance of 
moral considerations in the emergence of contempt (see also Mason, 2003). 
(3) Distinguishing different forms of efficacy to understand the strategic logic 
underlying different forms of collective action. An additional gap in our understanding of 
collective action relates to the role of perceived efficacy and different forms of action. 
Although our findings were less consistent with respect to the link between efficacy and 
normative and non-normative action, there was some evidence that while normative action 
was associated with high levels of group efficacy and political efficacy, the relation was 
negative for non-normative action. Does this mean that non-normative action is an irrational 
strategy, perhaps driven simply by a desire for revenge? We do not believe that this is the case 
and there are many historical examples that attest to the strategic logic of anti-system action 
and violence. For example, Sedgwick (2004) suggests that the purpose of the 9/11 attacks was 
to provoke a counter-attack from the US that would then have a radicalizing effect on Al-
Qaeda’s constituency (which it did). The attainment of this short-term political goal might 
then increase the likelihood of achieving the ultimately desired goal of uniting Muslims under 
a pan-Islamic state. Sageman (2004) similarly described how Egyptian Islamic Jihad used 
violence to provoke even more repressive measures by the government which would then 
alienate the general population and mobilize them against the regime.  
To explore the role of efficacy calculations in non-normative action further, we 
suggest that future research should specifically examine the efficacy of different forms of 
48 
 
action (i.e., action efficacy; see Saab, Spears, Tausch & Sasse, 2015). While efficacy 
measured generally may well be associated with the efficacy of normative action and thus 
works as a negative predictor of non-normative action, the efficacy of non-normative action 
might be a more specific and positive predictor of non-normative action. Additionally, future 
work should distinguish different forms of efficacy (e.g., the efficacy of an action in gaining 
public support, gaining the attention of third parties, and mobilizing a movement; see Hornsey 
et al., 2006). Such work would shed more light on the strategic logic of non-normative action 
and provide vital insights into when and why non-normative action becomes an attractive 
option. This would also facilitate the theoretical reconciliation of our findings with existing 
theory, in particular social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which views social 
conflict under stable conditions as unlikely (see Spears, Scheepers, van Zomeren, Tausch, & 
Gooch, 2015). 
 (4) Understanding how repression of protest affects motivations to participate in 
normative and non-normative future protest. The studies presented in this review are some 
of just a few empirical studies on the outcomes of collective action participation. We believe 
that while they present initial causal evidence that outcomes are important, future research is 
needed to examine the influence of outcomes on future action in more detail (see also van 
Zomeren et al., 2012). One typical occurrence during protest is that the police compel activists 
to end a demonstration, for example, by containing (“kettling”) parts of the demonstration to 
stop further movement, or by forcing activists to quit the field. This type of repression of 
protest can incite activists to engage in more extreme actions. The elaborated social identity 
model provides important observations on how activists are radicalized as a consequence of 
such actions (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998). For 
instance, in a series of observational studies, Drury and Reicher (1999; 2000) suggest that the 
behaviour of the outgroup is crucial in forming identities and action tendencies among 
activists. More direct evidence of the effects of outgroup actions during protest comes from a 
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recent series of studies conducted in repressive contexts (e.g., Egypt, Russia) by Ayanian and 
Tausch (2015a; 2015b), which demonstrated that the perceived likelihood of repression of 
protest (e.g., through arrest or violent counter-action) in fact increased commitment to further 
action among activists by, for example, fueling emotions and increasing the expected effects 
of protest on group consolidation.  
Repression does not only happen during demonstrations. Leaders of movements are 
often punished days or weeks after their participation in order to serve as a deterrent and to 
suppress further protest. For instance, the members of the punk band Pussy Riot were arrested 
and imprisoned for 21 months as punishment for their political protest in a church in Russia 
(Oliphant, 2012, Selby 2014). Similarly, protest by German students was weakened by 
punishing three leaders of the protest movement against tuition fees for participating in the 
blockage of highways (Schmiedekampf, 2006). On the one hand, punishment can clearly be 
intimidating. For instance, student protestors stopped blocking highways during the lawsuit, 
and activists were concerned that they might also receive penalties. On the other hand, 
punishment of the movement’s leaders can also lead to outcomes that motivate future action. 
First, severe repression of protest can lead group members to idealize the movement’s leaders 
and spark waves of solidarity around the world. For instance, there was a wave of solidarity 
and openly articulated expressions of illegitimacy as a response to the imprisonment of Pussy 
Riot (e.g., Ryzik, 2012). Second, punishment can elicit feelings of contempt towards the 
government and the system as a whole, and it can increase activists’ identification with the 
protest movement and foster their disidentification with the system. As our work has 
illustrated, feelings of contempt, a heightened politicized identity and disidentification from 
the broader group motivate participation in future (non-normative) collective action. In light 
of these examples, it would be important for future work to further investigate how 
punishment aimed at weakening the movement can actually radicalize activists, empower 
them, and increase normative and non-normative protest behaviour.  
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Moreover, it would be interesting to see how third parties are affected by the type of 
action strategy (normative vs. non-normative) and the outcome of protest (see also Thomas & 
Louis, 2014). According to the political solidarity model of social change (Subašić et al., 
2008), one aim of protest is to influence third parties. Protest behaviour can be regarded as an 
expression of the struggle between the minority of activists and the authority (e.g., the 
government) in winning the support of the majority of the population. The Pussy Riot 
example shows that political solidarity can also be sparked when activists are unfairly treated 
by the authority (government, police). Similarly, in a study on third party support, it has been 
demonstrated that support for future radical action can be (indirectly) promoted in a social 
context of corruption that undermined legitimacy and efficacy of normative action (Thomas & 
Louis, 2014). Thus, in light of repression, more radical action does not automatically lead to a 
loss of sympathy among third party supporters.  
(5) Understanding the role of disidentification in the survival and breakdown of 
social movements. Building on the ideas outlined above, it would be fruitful to study how 
social movements survive despite the failures and internal conflicts they may experience. The 
research described in this review illustrates that activists with more radical agendas for social 
change (often the vanguard of the movement) respond with disidentification when their 
radical actions are not supported by ingroup members. Disidentification of group members 
can lead to splits within social movements. There are several examples of left-wing groups 
splitting into smaller subgroups because of internal conflicts (e.g., Sani & Reicher, 1998). 
Sometimes long-term movements break up because they fail to absorb different political 
standpoints (e.g., the German antifascist group in Berlin, Antifaschistische Linke Berlin, 
2014). Break-ups and splits can weaken protest movements. Moreover, research illustrates 
that less mainstream groups sometimes behave in hostile ways towards other minority groups 
that are similar but more mainstream than their ingroup (e.g., vegans evaluate vegetarians 
more negatively than vegetarians evaluate vegans, White & Langer, 1999; White, Schmitt & 
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Langer, 2006). Disidentification from the broader group could be seen as the starting-point of 
increasing perceived distinctiveness from the mainstream that, in turn, can lead to splits of 
movements and horizontal hostility between minority subgroups (White et al., 2006). Thus, 
future research is needed to examine the factors that may prevent disidentification of radical 
activists and that may protect the breakdown of movements. Related to this, more work is 
needed in real life contexts.  
Moreover, it would be helpful to assess disidentification using a more specific 
measure in future work. Becker et al. (2011b) measured disidentification using identification 
scales. They interpreted a decrease in identification at Time 2 as evidence of disidentification. 
This is problematic given that low scores on the identification scale can also illustrate non-
identification (a neutral relation to one’s ingroup). Recent research introduced a multi-
component measure of ingroup disidentification by distinguishing the three components of 
detachment, dissatisfaction and dissimilarity (Becker & Tausch, 2014). This newly developed 
disidentification scale is able to differentiate between disidentification and non-identification 
and may therefore provide more detailed insights into the psychological processes that are 
involved in disengagement from social movements.  
(6) How predictors of and barriers to collective action operate over time. In terms of 
barriers to social change, two findings need further investigation. First, Becker (2012b) 
reasoned that a positive redefinition of an externally imposed negative group attribute (“black 
is beautiful”) could encourage collective action, because it promotes a new perspective and 
seeks to change the way in which the group is viewed in society at large (e.g., Galinsky et al., 
2003). However, although a positive redefinition did not undermine collective action, it also 
did not enhance protest intentions for social change. Similarly, Becker et al. (2013) expected 
that having a friend in the advantaged group who communicated that she/he perceives the 
intergroup inequality to be illegitimate should increase the intentions of members of 
disadvantaged groups to engage in collective action for more social justice. However, again, 
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although communication about illegitimacy did not undermine action, it also did not enhance 
collective action for social change. We suggest that the time perspective matters. A positive 
redefinition and communication about illegitimacy may need more time and elaboration to 
bring about changes in behaviours. Thus, future research could investigate whether a positive 
redefinition of the externally imposed negative group attribute and communication about 
illegitimacy of intergroup inequality in cross-group contact situations represent the first in a 
longer sequence of steps that initiate a critical awareness which then leads to increased 
willingness to participate in protest in the future (see also Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009). 
Initial evidence suggests that although cross-group contact increases a social mobility mindset 
among members of low status groups, this individual mobility orientation does not lead to 
decreased interest in protest (Tausch et al., 2015). Instead it is possible that individual 
mobility can also foster politicization of individuals. That is, individuals from a disadvantaged 
group who successfully obtained a higher status position may want to become role models for 
members of the disadvantaged group and may support their group’s struggle for more social 
justice in the long run.  
(7) Extending the model to collective action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups. 
Thus far, all of our research was concerned with collective action initiated by members of 
disadvantaged groups. We think, however, that many of the mechanisms described here also 
apply in the case of solidarity-based collective action, that is, collective action by members of 
advantaged groups on behalf of a disadvantaged group (e.g., among Whites who are active in 
anti-racism movements or men who take action for feminist causes; see Iyer & Ryan, 2009; 
Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, in press; Subašić et al., 2008; van Zomeren, Postmes, 
Spears & Bettache, 2011). We suggest that the generalizability of our findings to such forms 
of collective action should be examined in future research.  
Central to such action seems to be the formation of a shared identity with the 
disadvantaged (see Subašić et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2012) against a common opponent 
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(e.g., the government, a racist group). This may involve the formation of, and identification 
with, an opinion-based or politicized group (e.g., groups formed around particular causes and 
shared opinions that become part of people’s social identity, such as being an anti-racism 
activist; Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & 
Bongiorno, 2009; see also Stürmer & Simon, 2004). We would expect similar psychological 
factors to predict engagement in such action. For example, people would be more likely to 
participate in (normative) action in response to events that they perceive as unjust based on 
this identity, to the extent to which this identity is central to them, and the extent to which 
they perceive action as likely to be effective. Similarly participation in non-normative action 
should be more likely when the opponent is viewed with contempt and group efficacy (or 
specifically the efficacy of normative action) is low. Our findings regarding the psychological 
outcomes of collective action and their implications for future action should apply just as well 
to solidarity-based collective action and opinion-based groups. 
Our ideas regarding the barriers to collective action can also be applied, with some 
important modifications. For example, one issue that is likely to pose a threat to advantaged 
group members’ positive social identity is that of its morality, which is difficult to maintain 
when one’s group is exploiting or oppressing another. As described by Tajfel (1974), when 
the superior status of one’s ingroup comes to be viewed as highly illegitimate and morally 
unjustifiable, members of advantaged groups are likely to (physically and/or psychologically) 
leave the group and might identify with the disadvantaged group. This of course implies that 
alternative ways of identity management, such as comparing one’s group to another group 
which fares worse on this dimension (“minorities have much less rights in other countries”) , 
or establishing ingroup morality on an alternative dimension (“we pay a lot of foreign aid”), 
can undermine outgroup solidarity. Moreover, existing loyalties to the advantaged group (high 
identification) are likely to impede solidarity-based collective action. However, while 
intergroup contact seems to reduce collective action tendencies among disadvantaged group 
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members, it might have the opposite effect for advantaged group members, who might shift 
their loyalties from the advantaged to the disadvantaged group as a consequence of contact 
(see Reimer & Hewstone, under review, and Tausch, Saguy, Bryson, & Singh, 2015, for 
initial evidence; see also Pettigrew, 2010, for a discussion of this issue).  
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the present work extends previous research on collective action by 
demonstrating the importance of distinguishing between normative and non-normative action, 
highlighting that participation in protest has psychological consequences that feed back into 
future action intentions, and by examining barriers to engagement. Future research is needed 
to examine these processes in more detail. Most of the points listed above indicate that more 
research is needed to investigate the dynamic interplay between outcomes of collective action 
participation and activists’ motivation to engage in future protest. Another common theme 
underlying our suggestions for future research relates to the question of how people are 
radicalized. Although we believe that contempt, efficacy perceptions, disidentification from 
the system, perceptions of the outgroup’s behaviour and repression of protest play important 
roles, future research is needed to provide a more nuanced understanding of how 
radicalization occurs. Finally, it is important to examine the applicability of our ideas to 
collective action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups. 
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 Scale M SD 
Violence against Military Targets 
   
Understand violence to force Western military forces out of Muslim countries 0 – 9  5.86 2.78 
Violence to force Western military forces out of Muslim countries justified 0 – 9  4.74 3.08 
Support for violence against Western military targets 
-5 – +5 -.56 3.48 
Attitudes towards British Muslims fighting against Western military 
-5 – +5 -.84 3.31 
Violence against Civilian Targets 
   
Support for violence against civilian targets in the West 
-5 – +5 -3.99 2.26 
Understand why British Muslims might want to carry out suicide bombings 0 – 9  2.52 3.04 
7/7 London bombings justified 0 – 9  .77 1.95 
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Means (and standard deviations) of the dependent measures as a function of experimental 
condition, Study 2 (N = 81). Becker et al. (2013). Reprinted from Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 39, Becker, J.C., Wright, S.C., Lubensky, M.E., & Zhou, S., Friend or 
ally: Whether cross-group contact undermines collective action depends what advantaged 
group members say (or don’t say), 442-455. 
 
Feelings of 
closeness with 
partner* 
Feeling toward 
UBC 
Collective Action 
Intentions 
Taking Flyers 
legitimate  6.48 (.09) 65.00 (17.62) 4.31 (.86) 13.00 (13.02) 
illegitimate 6.49 (.09) 67.14 (17.07) 4.96 (.92) 23.81 (20.85) 
ambiguous 6.40 (.10) 66.11 (18.52) 4.07 (1.12) 18.89 (15.68) 
control 6.50 (.09) 55.00 (17.11) 4.99 (.96) 32.73 (26.58) 
Note. *Means for feelings of closeness with partner at T2 (after Jenga) are controlled for 
feelings of closeness with partner at T1 (after face drawing). Numbers in parentheses for this 
variable are standard errors 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Results of multiple regression analysis (Study 1, N = 332). Path coefficients are 
standardized estimates. Unless otherwise noted, solid paths indicate significant 
effects based on 95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals. + denotes 
effects approaching statistical significance (p <.10). The analysis controls for age 
and gender. Tausch et al. (2011). Reprinted from Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 101, Tausch, N., Becker, J.C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, & 
Siddiqui, R.N., Explaining radical group behaviour: developing emotion and 
efficacy routes to normative and non-normative collective action, 129-148, 
Copyright 2011. 
Figure 2. Results of multiple regression analysis (Study 2, N = 156). Path coefficients are 
standardized estimates. Unless otherwise noted, solid paths indicate significant 
effects based on 95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals. + denotes 
effects approaching statistical significance (p <.10). The analysis controls for age, 
gender, and socio-economic status. Tausch et al. (2011). Reprinted from Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 101, Tausch, N., Becker, J.C., Spears, R., Christ, 
O., Saab, R., Singh, & Siddiqui, R.N., Explaining radical group behaviour: 
Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and non-normative collective 
action, 129-148, Copyright 2011. 
Figure 3. Results of multiple regression analysis (Study 3, N = 466). Path coefficients are 
standardized estimates. Unless otherwise noted, solid paths indicate significant 
effects based on 95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals. + denotes 
effects approaching statistical significance (p <.10). The analysis controls for age, 
gender, and socio-economic status. Tausch et al. (2011). Reprinted from Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 101, Tausch, N., Becker, J.C., Spears, R., Christ, 
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O., Saab, R., Singh, & Siddiqui, R.N., Explaining radical group behaviour: 
Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and non-normative collective 
action, 129-148, Copyright 2011. 
Figure 4. Structural model (N = 98). ; χ2(9) = 14.09, p = .119, χ2/df = 1.57, CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .076 (p-close=.252), SRMR = .07. Path coefficients are standardized 
estimates, *** p < .001; ** p < .01. Tausch & Becker (2013). Reprinted from British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 52, Tausch, N. & Becker, J.C., Emotional reactions to 
success and failure of collective action as predictors of future action intentions: A 
longitudinal investigation in the context of student protests against tuition fees in 
Germany, 525-542. 
Figure 5. Mean scores of identification with the broader in-group at Time 2 adjusted for Time 
1 scores as a function of action type and support, Study 2. Becker et al. (2011). 
Reprinted from Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, Becker, J.C., Tausch, 
N., Spears, R. & Christ, O., Committed dis(s)idents: Participation in radical collective 
action fosters disidentification with the broader in-group but enhances political 
identification, 1104-1116. 
Figure 6. Mean differences (and standard errors bars) in collective action intentions 
depending on experimental condition, Study 3. Becker (2012). Reprinted from 
Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 103, Becker, J.C., The system 
stabilizing role of identity management strategies: Social creativity can undermine 
collective action for social change, 647-662. 
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